The results of this month's election in Iraq continue to pose many complex questions. Despite claims of fraud from most of the candidates, there is little evidence to support such a conclusion. The margin which separates the top two parties is enough to indicate a reasonably fair and successful election (Iyad Allawi's secular al-Iraqiyya party received 91 parliamentary seats and Nouri al-Maliki's primarily Shiite Da'wa party received 89). In fact, the UN Security Council is calling on all of the Iraqi parties to "to respect the certified election results and the choices of the Iraqi people." A variety of international and independent observers, who were present for the election have made arguments that would support the UN's confidence in the election results.
International certification of the results and Iraq's election commission's (IEC) confidence in fraud-checking measures used during the election have not stopped the important players from trying to scuttle the outcome. Allawi, al-Maliki, the Sadrists and others have all at some stage made accusations of fraud or gross mismanagement of the electoral process. Al-Maliki's calls for a manual recount have been rejected by the IEC as "unnecessary." Ahmed Chalabi, one-time Bush golden boy, who gained a seat in parliament is still trying his best to skew the results and increase his standing. He oversees the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC), which almost prevented the election from occurring at all (and certainly altered the final vote tallies) due to its indiscriminate "de-baathification" program. Chalabi and his cohort Faisal al-Lami are now, through the AJC, attempting to disqualify 52 of the candidates who won seats on the basis of former ties to the Baath party. Many of the candidates, whose names the AJC refuses to disclose are likely members of Allawi's al-Iraqiyya party. If successful, Chalabi and al-Lami's tactic stands to give al-Maliki's party the lead and thus change the face of Iraq's government.
As things currently stand, Allawi has the first opportunity to form a coalition government, which in all likelihood would entail a partnership with the Iraqi National Alliance (Sadrists and Chalabi) and the Kurds. The government in such a form would represent a more diverse spectrum of Iraqis given the inclusion of Sunnis and secular Shiites (al-Iraqiyya), hard-line Shiites (Sadrists), and the Kurds of northern Iraq. If the AJC manages to thwart such a coalition from forming and al-Maliki is allowed to piece together a majority it is much less likely to include so many of Iraq's ethnic and religious sects due to the Da'wa party's Shiite leanings.
Interestingly, the Sadrists are making a push to be the decisive player in the post election melee. The group's leader, Moqtada al-Sadr (who currently is residing in Iran), announced through a representative in Baghdad that a nation-wide referendum should be held to select the prime minister. Sadr's group have already printed ballots, which include five options for the PM spot: Allawi, al-Maliki, Ibrahim al-Jaafari (a former PM), Adel Abdul Mahdi (current vice president), and Muhammad Jaffar al-Sadr (a relative of Sadr). While the referendum is being marketed as inclusive to all Iraqis it is unclear whether anyone beyond Sadr's supporters will actually participate. The results of the referendum will most likely be used as a bargaining chip or as a mandate from Sadr's supporters on the optimal ally in a coalition government.
On what the election after-effects mean for women and for the U.S. I defer to two very knowledgeable and qualified George Washington University professors--Marc Lynch (some may know him as Abu Aardvark) and Nesreen Barwari.
Lynch at The National & Barwari at Foreign Policy
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